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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE E. CHARLTON, 
Pl~aintiff and R~espondent, 
vs. 
GEORGE L. HACKETT, 
Defendant ~and Appellant. 
C·ase No. 9243 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This 'is an action for breach of con1tract. The 
contract admitted in evidence as Exhibit 1 is re-
produced herein. The ~greement provided for the 
exchange by plaintiff, George E. Charlton, of one 
jeep and one trailer for 68,333 shares of stock .of 
J-A Uranium, Inc. at its par value. 
Mr. Ch·arlton delivered the jeep and trailer 
but never received 'the stock. 
George E. Charlton became acquainted with 
(lefendant (appeltant herein) in February 1956. 
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They met in the office of Ackerson-Hackett Invest-
ment Company in the Continentai Bank Bldg., Salt 
Lake City J Utah ( Tr. 5) . Mr. Charl'ton had been 
referred 'to Ackerson-Hackett Investment Company 
by an attorney then practicing in this City relative 
to becoming underwriter for an issue of secur'ities in 
a company Mr. Charlton was in the process of regis-
tering with the Utah Securities Commission (Tr. 
21). 
The matter of the underwriting was first dis-
cussed and then the m·atter of the exchange which 
is the subject of 'this lawsuit (Tr. 22). Mr. Hackett 
testified that he stated 'to plaintiff, George Charl-
ton, that he could effeet a transaction on behalf 
of the company for the shares of J-A Uranium, 
Inc. stock in exchange for the jeep and trailer which 
Mr. Charlton was offering for sale (Tr. 20). He 
was informed that Ackerson-Hackett Investment 
was underwriter for these securities and that a 
public offering of the securities was then or would 
be commenced shortly (Tr. 26). The stock was to 
be delivered to Mr. Charlton upon the conclusion 
of the public offer and he was informed that it was 
anticip·ated th·at the offering would be concluded 
'in approximately ninety days ( Tr. 20). Exh'ibit 1 
was 'then prepared and signed by Mr. Charlton. The 
offering was never concluded ( Tr. 21) and the 
stock not delivered. 
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Mr. Charlton commenced_ this action against 
Mr. Hackett individually. Defendant contended that 
the agreement was with his principal Ackerson-
Hackett Inves'tment Company. The court found that 
the agreement was wi'th defendant personally and 
found that the reasonable value of 'the shares Mr. 
Charlton did not receive was 3¢ per sh·are and 
awarded judgment for $2049.99. 
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7. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
P'OINT I 
TRE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT GE·ORGE 
L. HACKETT WAS A PARTY TO THE EXCHANGE 
AGREEMENT. 
POINT II 
THE CO,URT ERRED IN ASSESSING DAMAGES 
IN THE AMOUNT OF $2049.99. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT GE·ORGE 
L. HACKETT WAS A PARTY TO THE EXCHANGE 
AGREEMENT. 
The issue is whether George L. Hac'kett was 
acting as agent for a dis1closed principal in this 
tranS'action. 
Restatement of the Law, Second, Agency 2d, 
V dlume II, §3'20. 
"Unless otherwise agreed, a person mak-
ing or purporting to make a contract with 
another as agent for a disclosed principai does 
not become a party to the contract. 
Comment: 
a. Whether or not a person purporting 
to act as agent for another becomes a party 
to the contract depends upon the agreement 
between such person and the other par1ty. 
See §146. As stated in Section 4, a principal 
is disclosed if, at the time of making the con-
tract in question, the other party to it has 
ndtice that the agent is acting for a principal 
and of the principal's identity. One who pur-
ports to con tract on behalf of a designated 
person does not manifest by this that he is 
making a contract on his own account, and 
only where he so manifests does the agen't 
become a party to a contract wh'ich he makes 
for the principal. In the absence of other facts, 
the inferen'Ce is that the parties have agreed 
that the princip·al is, and lthe agent is not, 
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a party. This is true although the agent uses 
such an expression as, "I will sell." 
Comment: 
b. Burden of proof. One bringing an 
action upon a contract has the burden of show-
ing that the other is a party to it. This ini-
'tial burden is satisfied in the plaintiff proves 
that the defendant has made a promise, the 
form of which does not indicate that it. was 
given as agent.'' 
Restatement of the Law, Second, Agency 2d, 
V dlume I, §4. 
" ( 1) If, at the time of a transaction 
con·ducted by an agent, the other party there-
to has notice that the agent is acting for a 
principal and of the principal's identity, the 
p:rincipal is a disclosed principal. 
Comment: 
d. . . . . If the manifestations of the 
principal or agent ars such as reasonably to 
indicate to the other party the identity or 
existence of the principal, the la'tter is dis-
closed or partially disclosed, and this is true 
a1though the other party believes that he is 
dealing with the agent alone ..... " 
Restatemen't of the Law, Second, Agency 2d, 
Volume I, §9. 
"'( 1) A person has notice of a- fact if 
he knows the fact, has reason to know it, 
shou~l'd know it, or has been g'iven notifica-
tion of it. 
Comment: 
d. Reason to know. A person h·as reason 
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to know of a fact if he has information from 
which a person of ordinary intelligence, or 
of the superior intelligence wh'ich such. per-
son may have, would i11fer tha:t the fact in 
question exists or that there is such a sub-
stantial chance of its existence that, if exer-
cising reasonable care with reference to the 
matter in question, his ·action would be pre-
dicated upon the assumption of i'ts possible 
existence. The inference drawn need not be 
that the fact exists; it is sufficient that the 
l'ikelihood of its existence is so great 'that a 
person of ordinary intelligence, or of the su-
perior intelligence which the person in ques-
tion has, would, if exercising ordinary pru-
dence under the circumstances, govern his 
conduct as if the fact existed, until he could 
ascertain its existence or non-exis'tence. 
Comment: 
e. Shou'ld know. A person should know 
of a fact if a person of ordinary prudence and 
intelligence, or the intelligence which such 
person has or professes to have, would as-
certain, in the performance of his duty to 
another,· that such fact exists or tha1t there 
is such a substantial chance of its existence 
that his action would be predicated upon its 
possible existence. The words ''should know'' 
express the idea tha't the person of whom they 
are spoken has a duty to others to ascertain 
facts or, if he does not ascertain 'them, to act 
with reference to the likelihood that such 
fact~. exist. 
Mr. Charlton testified that Ackerson-Hackett 
Investment Company was not mentioned during 
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their conversations, (Tr. 7) that he made no in-
quiries concerning the principal (Tr. 15) but ad-
mitted th·at the name Ackerson-Hackett Investment 
Company appeared on the office door ( Tr. 9) . He 
acknowledged th~t the name Ackerson-Hackett In-
vestment Company appeared on the agreement that 
he signed (Exhibit 1) and on the stock confirma-
tion he received (Exhibit 2). He did not deny that 
he had been referred to Ackerson-Hackett Invest-
ment Company by ·an attorney in this City in re-
gard to a proposed public offering of stock in a 
company th·at he was registering with the Utah 
Securities Commission. There is no direct lestimony 
nor ·can ft be inferred, that George L. Hackett made 
any promises to plaintiff, George Charlton, in his 
individual cap~aeity. 
The circumstances surrounding this transac-
tion elearly show the existence and identi'ty of a 
princip·a'l, and such being tl1e case, the defendant, 
George L. Hacke'tt, was not a party to the con tract. 
See State v. Bonnett, 201 P. 2d 939 (Utah). 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING DAMAGES 
IN THE AMOUNT OF $2049.99. 
The lower court awarded judgment to plain-
tiff for the reasonable value of the shares of stock 
that he did not receive under the contract and 
found the value to be $2049.99, or 3¢ per share. 
As stated in Volume 12A, Fletcher Cyclopedia 
Corporations, §5 631, 
''If the seller of stock refuses or fails 
to perform in accordance with h'is contrac1t, 
the purchaser may maintain an action for 
damages . . . . Ordina1~fl'y the measure of 
damages is the difference between the con-
tract price and the market price at the time 
and p~ace fixed for delivery .... If the stock 
has no market value, the plaintiff is entitled 
to recover its actual value to be ascertained 
from the value of the corporate assets the 
amount of .its liabilities, the dividend earn-
ing capacity of 'the stoc kand the like. Nom-
inal damages may be recovered where a breach 
of the contract is shown, ·although no dam-
ages proved.'' 
See also 18 Corpus Juris Secundum, Corpora-
tions §415: 
"The value of stock is generally ascertained 
by its market value, but resort may be held to other 
sources when necessary. 
There is no presumption that the face 
value of the stock is its real value, and as a 
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general rule the manner of ascertaining its 
va'lue, as a basis for estim·ating damages, is 
to show its market value at the time and p1'ace 
it should have been delivered, and not as of 
the date of the contract. Neither the book 
value nor the 'intrinsic value of the stock 
should enter into the estimate, unless it has 
no market value, in which ca'Se resort may 
be had to sources other than the market 
value to determine its actual value~ and the 
property of the corporation as compared with 
. its liabilities at that time m·ay be ·shown, 
but the affairs of the corporation cannot be 
considered in determining market va1ue, 
where there is evidence of several sales of 
such stock and the price for which it was 
sold, although it is not shown to be the sub-
ject of daily 'traffic. In order that stock may 
have a market value it is not necessary that it 
be the subject of daily traffic by beiing bought 
and sold on the streets or in the frequent 
dealings of trades people ; it is enough if it 
is occasionally the subject of sale or exchange 
in the community so as to fix upon the stock 
at different times a customary price." 
The rule may be stated concisely that the 
measure of damages for failure to deliver stock is 
the market price, if there is a market for the stock 
and if there is no market for the stock, then the 
measure of the damages is the actu·al or intrinsic 
va'lue of the stock. 
The shares of stock of J-A Uranium, Inc. did 
not have a market value fron1 the date of the ex-
10 
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change contract, February 15, 1956, to and includ-
ing the date of trial ( Tr. 24). This fact was testi-
fied to by defendant. Plaintiff offered no evidence 
to the contrary. 
Evidently, the court based its finding of value 
on the fact that J-A Uranium, In.c. had or was 
about to commence a public offering of stock ·at 
3¢ per share, but there is no evidence whatever 
of any sales at th·at price. Such being the case, the 
court should have looked to the actual value of the 
stock and there was no evidence introduced as to 
its ac'tu·al value. 
''Generally the courts wi'l'l indulge no 
presumption as to the value of particular pro-
perty. Thus, no presumption ex'ists in the 
absence of all supporting evidence that cor-
porate stock is worth par or even tha:t i't has 
substantial value." 20 Am. Jur. Evidence 
§242. 6 A.L.R. 2d 189. 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, there was 
no evidence as to the market value or the actual 
value of the stock in question and no evidence of 
any sales under the company's public offering. 
The defendant's motion to dismiss (Tr. 15) should 
have been granted. 
GTant vs. I.iovekin, 132A. 342 (Penn.) 
Wohlgem~~gh vs. Mendel, 172 N.Y. Supp. 259 
Roder vs. Nz~les, 111 N.E. 340 (Ind.) 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
Appellant contends that the evidence is not 
sufficient to sustain the court's findings and judg-
ment on two poin'ts, namely: ( 1) That appellant, 
George L. Hackett, was a party to the contract, 
and (2) that the value of the shares of J-A Urani-
um, Inc. ·was 3¢ per share. 
(1) The evidence shows that plaintiff-res-· 
pondent had notice of 'the existence and identity of 
the principal Ackerson-Hack~tt Investment Com-
pany, as that term is defined in the Restatement, 
and therefore, the complaint of plaintiff should have 
been dismissed. 
( 2) The record contains no evidence of the 
value of the shares of J-A Uranium, Inc. The court's 
finding of a Va'lue . was arbitrary and complete'ly 
without a· foundation in the record. 
- The findings and judgment of the court should 
he set aside and the complaint of plaintiff-respon-
dent dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD M. GARRETT 
Attorney for Appellant 
1307 Walker Ban.k Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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